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DAMAGES FOR THE WRONGFUL DEATH OF A FETUS-PROOF
OF FETAL VIABILITY-Illinois Recognizes an Action for the Wrongful
Death of a Stillborn Fetus. Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Il1.2d 368,
304 N.E.2d 88 (1973).
There was no recovery for prenatal torts at the early common law.-
This was true not only for nonfatal injuries incurred while en ventre sa
mere, 2 but also under the more recent statutory action for wrongful death.3
Gradually during the twentieth century, actions for fetal torts were per-
mitted, first for mere injuries sustained while in utero,4 and later for the
wrongful death of a child born alive, but whose injuries sustained while in
utero caused its death.5 But where a fetus had received fatal injury suffi-
cient to effect a stillbirth, the courts have been more reluctant to allow an
action ,by the survivors for wrongful death. However, the Supreme Court
of Illinois, in Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg,6 has recently permitted the
survivors of a stillborn fetus to sue for its wrongful death where the injuries
were sustained while the fetus was in a viable state.
In September of 1966, decedent's mother, while in her 36th week of
pregnancy, was struck by defendants' automobile as she walked across a
street on the Southwest Side of Chicago. Emergency surgery failed to save
the child who, according to the complaint, had died as a result of the acci-
dent. The complaint was in two counts, one for the injuries to the mother
and one for the wrongful death of the stillborn child. The action by the
mother for her own injuries is not herein involved. Upon dismissal of the
complaint, plaintiff -appealed to the appellate court.7 That court affirmed
the dismissal, relying on the premise that a fetus does not become a "person"
as that term is ordinarily understood until the instant of birth. Plaintiff
then perfected an appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, which was faced
with the construction of the word "person" in the Illinois Wrongful Death
Act.8  The issue for determination was at what point in its development a
1. A more accurate statement, according to SALMOND, TORTS 346 (10th ed.
Stallybrass 1945), would be that there was no English authority on either side of the
question. Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that no action was permitted. The his-
tory of this action is well summarized in 5B L. MED. CYC. § 37.29-32 (1972);
PROSSER, TORTS § 55 (4th ed. 1971) (hereinafter cited as PROSSER); Gordon, The Un-
born Plaintiff, 63 MICH. L. REV. 579 (1965) (hereinafter cited as Gordon).
2. "In its mother's womb."
3. The wrongful death acts originated with the enactment of the Fatal Accidents
Act of 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93, commonly known as Lord Campbell's Act.
4. "In the uterus," used synonymously with en ventre sa mere.
5. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH §§ 4.29-33 (1966) (hereinafter
cited as SPEISER); Annot., Action for Death of Unborn Child, 15 A.L.R.3d 992 (1967).
6. 55 Ill. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973).
7. 3 Ill. App. 3d 442, 279 N.E.2d 440 (1972).
8. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, §§ 1, 2 (1973). In pertinent part:
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fetus acquires legal personality for purposes of the action for wrongful
death.9 In this and other legal contexts, arguments have been propounded
that the legal line of life ,be drawn at the various stages of preconception, 10
conception," quickness, 12 viability,' 3 or live birth.14  The court, relying on
the earlier case of Amann v. Faidy,15 decided that viability, "the time at
which a child is capable of being delivered and remaining alive separate
from and independent of the mother,"'16 is realistically and reasonably the
appropriate line of demarcation. Thus the court held that there could be
a recovery under the Wrongful Death Act for the wrongful death of a vi-
able child or fetus born dead as a result of injuries negligently inflicted while
en ventre sa mere. In so doing, the court placed Illinois law in accord with
the majority of American jurisdictions which have passed upon this point. 17
1. Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect
or default, and the act, neglect, or default is such as would, if death had not
ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover
damages in respect thereof, then and in every such case the person who or
company or corporation which would have been liable if death had not en-
sued, shall be liable to an action for damages ....
9. The fetus is often a person under the common law of crimes and property.
The civil law regards the fetus in utero as born whenever birth would be to its advan-
tage. PROSSER § 55, at 336, n.17; Gordon, 590, n.71.
10. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 I1. App. 2d 240, 250, 190 N.E.2d 849, 854 (1963),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964) (dictum that child born malformed because of pre-
conception genetic harm to parents caused by radioactivity should be allowed to re-
cover).
11. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973): Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line
Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956): Daley v. Meier, 33 Ill. App. 2d 218, 178
N.E.2d 691 (1961); Cheaney v. State, 285 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind., 1972); Puhl v. Mil-
waukee Auto Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959) (dictum). See also Gor-
don, 590, n.67; 1960 U. ILL. L. FOR. 593, n.31.
12. "Quickening" has been defined as the first recognizable movement of the fetus
in utero, appearing usually from the 16th to the 18th week of pregnancy. Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. at 132. See Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955).
13. Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838, 10 A.L.R.2d 634
(1949), was the first American case which permitted recovery for the wrongful death
of a viable fetus whose prenatal injury caused death before birth. See generally
SPEISER, note 5 supra, § 4.32.
14. E.g., Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65, 248 N.E.2d 901
(1969); 2 HARPER &JAMES. TORTS § 18.3 (1956).
15. 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953).
16. Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill. 2d 368, 374, 304 N.E.2d 88, 92
(1973).
17. At present 21 jurisdictions would permit an action for the wrongful death of a
stillborn fetus who was fatally injured while viable; 12 jurisdictions would not.
Those permitting are: Mace v. Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706 (D.C. Alas. 1962) (by im-
plication); Simmons v. Howard Univ., 323 F. Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1971); Hatala v.
Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 224 A.2d 406 (1966); Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara,
Inc., 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557 (1956); Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d
100 (1955) ("quick" fetus included in punitive-based statute which provides for both
children and adults); Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 I1. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88
(1973); Britt v. Sears,-Ind. App.-, 277 N.E.2d 20 (1971); Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan.
143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962); Rice v. Rizk, 453 S.W.2d 732 (Ky. 1970); Valence v. La.
Power & Light Co., 50 So. 2d 847 (La. App. 1951); State ex rel. Odham v. Sherman,
DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
This case will initially serve as a vehicle for reviewing the Illinois chap-
ter in the history of prenatal tort actions. This will be followed by a syn-
opsis of the case itself. Finally, two problems left open by this decision
will be discussed. The first problem is the proper measure of damages for
the wrongful death of a fetus, and the second is the proof of fetal viability.
THE CHRISAFOGEORGIS RATIONALE AS SEEN THROUGH ILLINOIS PRECEDENT
The prenatal injury controversy first began in Illinois in 1900 with Al-
laire v. St. Luke's Hospital.'s In that case the mother had entered the hos-
piutal in preparation for delivery. An accident caused by the mechanical
malfunction of an elevator resulted in a permanently crippled child. The
child, although viable when the the harm was inflicted, was denied recovery
for injuries sustained en ventre sa mere.19 But in terms of legal history what
was more significant then the holding of this case was the dissenting opinion
234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964); O'Neill v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 188 N.W.2d 785
(1971); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949); Rainey v.
Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954) (But see Occhipinti v. Rheem Mfg. Co.,
252 Miss. 172, 172 So. 2d 186 (1965)); Acton v. Shields, 386 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. 1965)
(by implication); White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 458 P.2d 617 (1969); Poliquin v. Mac-
Donald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); Jasinsky v. Potts, 153 Ohio St. 529, 42
Ohio Ops. 9, 92 N.E.2d 809 (1950); Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42
(1964); Baldwin v. Butcher, - W. Va. -, 184 S.E.2d 428 (1971); Kwaterski v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967).
In addition, three states have recently permitted a wrongful death action where
there has been a live birth, but have expressly reserved decision on the stillbirth situa-
tion. Huskey v. Smith, 289 Ala. 52, 265 So. 2d 596 (1972); Sylvia v. Gobeille,-R.I.
-, 220 A.2d 223 (1966) (rejecting viability standard); Leal v. C.C. Pitts Sand &
Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1967).
Those denying the action are: Bayer v. Suttle, 23 Cal. App. 3d 361, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 213 (1972) (8th month of pregnancy, appeal not perfected); Stokes v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1967); McKillip v. Zimmerman,-Iowa-, 191
N.W.2d 706 (1971) (But see Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (D.C. Iowa 1960);
Leccese v. McDonough,-Mass.-, 279 N.E.2d 339 (1971); Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co.,
155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951) (based on lack of precedent); Graf v. Taggert, 43
N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964) (based on the speculative amount of pecuniary loss);
Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65, 248 N.E.2d 901 (1969); Gay
v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425, 15 A.L.R.3d 983 (1966); Padillow v.
Elrod, 424 P.2d 16 (Okla. 1967) (as for legislature to change); Marko v. Phil. Transp.
Co., 420 Pa. 124, 216 A.2d 502 (1966) (6 mo. fetus); Durrett v. Owens, 212 Tenn.
614, 371 S.W.2d 433 (1963) (7 mo. fetus); Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 210 Va.
138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969).
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869 (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970) leaves
the question open:
(1) One who tortiously causes harm to an unborn child is subject to lia-
bility to the child for such harm if it is born alive.
(2) If the child is not born alive, there is no liability unless the appli-
cable wrongful death statute so provides.
Excellent analyses of the pertinent statutes are found in SPEISER, note 5 supra, at
773; 7 Hous. L. REV. 449 (1970); 13 J. FAM. L. 99, 111 (1973).
18. 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
19. It appears from the case that the mother only recovered for her own injuries.
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of Justice Boggs. His forceful and eloquent argument helped persuade later
courts to change the common law rule prohibiting recovery by a viable fetus:
[The mother] may die . . . and the child remain alive, and cap-
able of maintaining life, when separated from ,the dead body of
the mother. If at that -period a child so advanced is injured . . .
is it not sacrificing truth to a mere -theoretical abstraction to say
the injury was not to the child, 'but wholly to the mother?20
This lone dissent was until 1933 the sole common law2' judicial challenge
to Holmes' famous revitalization 22 of the ancient rule23 that a fetus is not
sui juris for purposes of tort law. Subsequently, American courts began per-
mitting actions for fetal injuries and wrongful death.
24
Illinois law was put in accord with that trend in 1953. In Amann v.
Faidy,25 a case presenting the same essential facts as Chrisafogeorgis (save
that the Amann court treated the child as being born alive),26 a unanimous
court overruled Allaire and held:
[T]hat plaintiff, as administratrix of the estate of a viable child,
who suffered prenatal injuries and was thereafter born alive, has
a right of action [for wrongful death] against the defendant whose
alleged negligence caused the injuries.-7
The Amann court did not have great difficulty in permitting an action for
damages in the case of a live birth.28  But the stillborn child presented a
more troublesome case, one which until Chrisafogeorgis had not been de-
cided by the Illinois Supreme Court. 29 After discussing the arguments for
20. Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 11. 359, 370, 56 N.E. 638, 641 (1900) (Boggs,
J., dissenting).
21. Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. App. 1949), was decided under the
civil law in 1923. The Supreme Court of Canada, in Montreal Tramways v. LeVill,
4 D.L.R. 337 (1933) was the first common law court (albeit a strong civil law tradi-
tion) to permit an action for prenatal injuries. There is now no authority left support-
ing the older rule. PROSSER § 55.
22. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884). In that case
the fetus actually was born alive, but died ten or fifteen minutes later. See note -49
infra. But see Gordon, n.54.
23. The Earl of Bedford's Case, 7 Co. 7b, 8b: 77 Eng. Rep. 421, 424 (K.B.
1586), a property case, is an early recorded case setting down the dictum filius in
utero matris est pars viscerum matris ("A son in the mother's womb is part of the
mother's vitals." BLACK'S L. Der. 756 (4th ed. 1951).
24. PROSSER, § 55.
25. Amann v. Faidy, 415 III. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953).
26. As defendant failed to allege the specific defect complained of at trial, under
what was then ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 169 (1951), now ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §
45 (1973).
27. Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 432, 114 N.E.2d 412, 417 (1953) (Schaefer,
C.J.).
28. Amann has since been extended to permit recovery for injuries to a surviving
child sustained when he was a one month-old fetus. Daley v. Meier, 33 Il. App. 2d
218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1961). The same court affirmed this in Sana v. Brown, 35 Il1.
App. 2d 425, 183 N.E.2d 187 (1962).
29. In Rapp v. Hiemenz, 107 Ill. App. 2d 382, 246 N.E.2d 77 (1969), the court
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and against permitting a wrongful death action by the survivors of a stillborn
child, the Chrisafogeorgis court decided that allowing the action would not
effect a wanton abandonment of traditional elements of plaintiff's case.
Specifically, the court found irrelevant two 'basic arguments for denial
of the action. The first of these concerned the difficulty of proving the
causal relation between prenatal injury and death. The second argument
stressed the speculative measure of pecuniary loss to the survivors of a still-
born child.
As to the first of these, the court simply adhered to the issue at bar,
which was not one of fact, but of law. The peroration of a quotation from
Amann stated the essence of this argument:
The right to bring an action is clearly distinguishable from
the ability to prove the facts. The first cannot be denied because
the second may not exist.8 0
Nevertheless, the court observed in passing -that as the mother was in her
36th week 31 of pregnancy, there was no doubt as to the viability of the fetus.
It is thus inferred that proof of causation in fact (whether the injuries ef-
fected the death) would not be as difficult 32 in the case of a viable fetus
as in that of a previable fetus. Finally, the court noted that proof of proxi-
mate cause of death is no different in the case of stillbirth than in the case
of live birth.
33
The second argument against permitting the action, that of the proper
measure of damages, presents special problems. These problems will be
considered following a discussion of the position of the dissenting justices.
The three dissenters3 4 in Chrisafogeorgis maintained that the point of
viability, as opposed to the time of birth, is uncertain, indefinite, and, ac-
cording to a leading authority, "a most unsatisfactory criterion" of the ex-
istence of a legal human being for purposes of wrongful death.35 In con-
held that there was no wrongful death action in the case of an injury to a 4% month-old
fetus who was later stillborn.
30. Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill. 2d 368, 372, 304 N.E.2d 88, 90
(1973).
31. Viability usually begins around the 26th or 28th week. See text at note 98
inf ra.
32. Several courts have dealt with the causation problem. Compare Williams v.
Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949), and Bonbrest v.
Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
33. On the proximate cause question, see 9 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS Prenatal
Injuries 524, 545 (1961); GRADwOHL, LEGAL MEDICINE 442 (2d ed. Camps 1968);
NELSON, TExTBOOK OF PEDIATRmICS 18 (8th ed. 1964); PROSSER § 55, at 337, nn.21, 33;
Gordon 600-628; Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge in the Law Relating to
Prenatal Injuries, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 554 (1962).
34. Rvan, J., with Underwood, C.J., and Kluczynski, J., joining.
35. PROSSER § 55, at 337. However, Prosser later states that "all logic is in favor
of ignoring the stage at which (the injury) occurs." Id.
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demning the majority for "just pure judicial legislation" 36 by construing the
word "person" in the Wrongful Death Act to include the viable fetus, the
dissent first argued that the wrongful death action is in derogation of the
common law37 and hence must be strictly construed. 38 The statute was en-
acted in 1853 and by well-settled rules of statutory construction, the words
must be taken in the sense in which they were understood at the time when
the statute was enacted. 39 The United States Supreme Court recently ex-
amined40 the sense in which the word "person" was first used in the four-
teenth amendment41 (enacted just 15 years after the Wrongful Death Act
became law in Illinois) and concluded that the word "person", as initially
understood in the fourteenth amendment, did not include the unborn.42
Hence when the Illinois statute was enacted, the word "person" as originally
used in that Act did not encompass the unborn either.43
In addition, the Illinois General Assembly has amended the Wrongful
Death Act twelve times since 1853.44 The dissent noted that:
[I]n spite of the decisions of this court and other jurisdictions that
denied recovery for prenatal injuries the legislature did not amend
the Act to specifically create a cause of action for death of an un-
born fetus. 43
36. 55 Ill. 2d 368, 377, 304 N.E.2d 88, 93 (1973).
37. Supra note 3. Hawaii and Massachusetts have a wrongful death action by
judicial decision. Kake v. Horton, 2 Ha. 209 (1860); Gaudette v. Webb, -Mass.-,
284 N.E.2d 222 (1972).
38. Citing Wilson v. Tromly, 404 Ill. 307, 89 N.E.2d 22 (1949). But cf.:
"Death statutes have their roots in dissatisfaction with the archaisms of the law . . .
It would be a misfortune if a narrow or grudging process of construction were to ex-
emplify and perpetuate the very evils to be remedied." Cardozo, J., in Van Beeck v.
Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342, 350 (1936).
39. Citing 50 AM. JuR. Statutes § 236 (1944). Accord, People ex rel. Fyfe v.
Barnett, 319 Ill. 403, 409, 150 N.E. 290, 292 (1925).
On the other hand, the dissent could have used what Llewellyn termed the "anti-
rule" and have reached the opposite conclusion. While there may be a difference be-
tween statutory and constitutional interpretation (LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL
REASONING 58 (1948)), the words of another Court are appropriate: "The [Eighth]
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society." Warren, C.J., in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958).
40. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
41. E.g., "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."
42. The dissent refrained from stating the Roe Court's dictum that this ruling was
not inconsistent with the policy of some states to permit the parents of a stillborn child
to maintain an action for wrongful death because of prenatal injuries. Mr. Justice
Blackmun noted that what is really being vindicated in that case is the right of the un-
born child's parents to recover for their loss. (emphasis added) 410 U.S. 113, 157, 162
(1973).
43. Id.
44. Primarily in the area of limitations on recovery.
45. 55 Ill. 2d 368, 379, 304 N.E.2d 88, 94 (1973). More accurately, the legisla-
ture neither restricted nor expanded the court's power to modify or extend its earlier
decisions. In response to a similar argument, Mr. Justice Douglas cautioned: "It is
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Thus from legislative inaction the Chrisafogeorgis dissent inferred legislative
intent not to extend the scope of the Act's coverage to include the unborn,
and especially the stillborn.
4 6
Finally, the dissent used the New York Wrongful Death Act,47 with
its subsequent interpretation, for ,additional support. While New York per-
mits an Amann-type action to recover for injuries sustained in utero (which
causes death after a live birth),4 8 New York does not permit an action for
death of a stillborn fetus.49 Thus the New York construction would sup-
port the contention that there is no logical 'basis to expand Amann to still-
born fetuses. The dissent further stated:
The court in Endresz distinguished between the updating of a
common law action by judicial decision which was the effect of
the decision in Woods and the reinterpretation of a statutory cause
of action which had 'been created by the legislature.50
Hence the dissenters here were disinclined to engage in what was termed
"just pure judicial legislation" by extending judicial interpretation to an ac-
tion solely of legislative origin.
The Chrisafogeorgis court held that there may be liability for the wrong-
ful death of a viable fetus born dead as a result of injuries negligently in-
flicted while in utero. In so doing, the court left open two important ques-
tions: the measure of damages for the wrongful death of a fetus, and proof
of fetal viability. A discussion of the first of these follows.
EVALUATING A STILLBORN CHILD UNDER ILLINOIS LAW
In keeping to the narrow question of defendants' duty to plaintiff,
Chrisafogeorgis necessarily skirted the collateral issue of damages. The
court in dictum merely stated that, whether the child is born alive or still,
at best treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling
rule of law." Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946). On this point Chief
Justice Traynor contended: "But something more than mere silence should be required
before that (legislative) acquiescence is elevated into a species of implied legislation
such as to bar the court from reexamining its own premises." People v. Daniels, 71
Cal. 2d 1119, 80 Cal. Rptr. 897, 459 P.2d 225 (1969) (Traynor, C.J., dissenting).
46. See also Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (1954):
13 J. FAM. L. 99, 108 (1973).
47. E.P.T.L. 5-4.1 (formerly Decedent Estate Law, N.Y. CONSOL. LAWS ch. 13
§ 130).
48. Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691, 27 A.L.R.2d 1250 (1951).
49. Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65, 248 N.E.2d 901
(1969). Massachusetts reaches the same result. --Cf. Keyes v. Constr. Serv., Inc.,
340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960); Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 352
Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967) (previable fetus injured, lived 2 or 3 hours, and re-
covered; overrules Dietrich, note 22 supra, sub silentio); Leccese v. McDonough,
-Mass.-, 279 N.E.2d 339 (1971).
50. Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 111. 2d 368, 377, 304 N.E.2d 88, 93
(1973) (Ryan, J., dissenting).
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the difficulties in determining damages to the parents are no different.
However, the court did recognize that certain difficulties do exist. The
function of this section is to review these difficulties and to suggest solutions.
An action under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act6 ' proceeds on the
theory of compensating the next of kin for loss of the economic benefit
which they might reasonably have expected to receive from the decedent.
This economic benefit may take the form of support, services, or contribu-
tions during the remainder of the decedent's lifetime if he had not been
killed. 5 2 Until recently, solatium (damages for pain and suffering) was not
permitted in -wrongful death actions.
The law was changed in Murphy v. Martin Oil Co.53 There, plaintiff's
decedent was injured as a result of defendant's negligence, and died nine
days later. In a wrongful death action, plaintiff also claimed damages for
conscious pain and suffering of the decedent from the time of injury until
the time of death. Plaintiff was confronted with a long-standing precedent
54
that the wrongful death action was her exclusive remedy. Nevertheless,
the Illinois court agreed with plaintiff, stating -that the Wrongful Death Act
and the Survival Act55 are to be read separately. That is, the action for
injuries is not precluded by the action for wrongful death, 'but rather survives
independently from it. While it is suggested that Murphy and Chrisafogeor-
gis are distinguishable (in that the latter death was instantaneous), the
measure of damages for the wrongful death action was still the amount of
pecuniary loss suffered by the next of kin.
Where the next of kin are lineal, there is a presumption of "some sub-
stantial pecuniary loss."56 This is true even when both the decedent and
the lineal heirs are adults. 57  The presumption is rebuttable; its effect is
merely to establish a prima facie case absent evidence of loss. However,
the burden is shifted to defendant to establish facts to the contrary. 58
51. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (1973). In pertinent part:
mhe amount recovered in every such action shall be for the exclusive bene-
fit of the widow and next of kin of such deceased person and in every such
action the jury may give such damages as they shall deem a fair and just com-
pensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death,
to the wife and next of kin of such deceased person.
52. PROSSER § 127, at 906.
53. 56 111. 2d 423, 308 N.E.2d 583 (1974).
54. Holton v. Daly, 106 Ill. 131 (1882).
55. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 3, § 339 (1973). In pertinent part:
In addition to the actions which survive by the common law, the follow-
ing also survive: ...actions to recover damages for an injury to the person
(except slander and libel) ....
56. ILL. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 31.01.01 (1965) (hereinafter cited as
I.P.I.), adopted as law, ILL. REV. SrAT., ch. 110A, § 239(a) (1973). See Hall v. Gil-
lins, 13 Ill. 2d 26, 147 N.E.2d 352 (1958) and 16 I.L.P. Death § 45.
57. Naslund v. Watts, 80 Ill. App. 2d 464, 224 N.E.2d 474 (1967).
58. Flynn v. Vancil, 41 Ill. 2d 236, 242 N.E.2d 237 (1968), where the presumption
was rebutted in an action for the wrongful death of a two-week-old infant afflicted with
an independent and incurable congenital condition.
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The pecuniary loss method has its origin in the basic principle that
damages are only to be compensatory in nature.59 The Wrongful Death Act
was designed to prevent the deceased's dependents from becoming destitute
as a result of the fault of a third person. Rather, the Act shifted the loss
of the decedent's prospective earnings from the dependents to that third per-
son. 60  Later in the nineteenth century, recovery was also allowed for the
wrongful death of children, many of whom were fatally injured while work-
ing in order to help support the family. Since the action for the wrongful
death of both the child and the adult are based upon the same statute, the
pecuniary loss formula was extended to cover the child decedent as well.
But since the child was also dependent on the parents for economic sus-
tenance, in fairness to the defendant the court advised the jury to deduct
the probable costs of rearing the child. This method of determining the ex-
pected earnings of the child during minority, less the cost of raising him,
has been termed the "wage-profit" formula.61 This formula quickly gained
disfavor as its fictional foundation became apparent. Since "damages hon-
estly calculated on this basis could never be anything but a minus quan-
tity,"62 other methods were suggested to cope with the problem of "evaluat-
ing" the loss of a minor 63 child in those jurisdictions which employ the pe-
cuniary loss method.
Some authorities have suggested that no recovery be permitted at all.es
On the other 'hand, others believe that, while the method of this legal fiction
is improper, the end product is correct. For example, 'Dean Prosser stated:
59. 11 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1338 (3d ed. Jaeger 1968).
60. Gordon 594.
61. PROSSER § 127 at 909.
62. Id. That is, the expected earnings must exceed the costs of raising the child.
As for earnings, these would vary greatly from case to case. For example, in poorer
families, the child may begin gainful employment at an earlier age in order to help sup-
port the family. On the other hand, the child of a wealthier family would perhaps be
expected to earn a higher wage, although the wealthy child would remain in school
longer.
An effort should be made to estimate the costs of raising a child. In DUBLIN &
LoTKA, THE MONEY VALUE OF A MAN 57 (rev. ed. 1946), the authors estimated the cost
of raising a child to the age of eighteen (based on 1936 American society) to be
$20,785 (interest included) for a family with an income of $5,000 to $10,000. On the
basis of the change in price levels, as reflected in the STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 346, Table 568 (94th ed. 1973), the 1972 equivalent of this is $62,770.
But by another method (16 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS Proof of Lost Earning
Capacity and of Future Expenses 701 (1961)), which uses Department of Labor statistics
extrapolated to age 18, the figure is $32,745, assuming a family of three, constant
prices, a 1972 median income of $11,000 (which is the median in Illinois; STAT. ABST.,
supra, 332, Table 541), and is exclusive of interest. This method assumes the child
each year consumes an additional 1% of family income after age 5; thus at age 18, the
child consumes 24% of family income.
63. Some jurisdictions even extend recovery beyond the age of majority, the spec-
ulative nature of the damages notwithstanding. PROSSER § 127 at 909.
64. E.g., Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964); 2 HARPER & JAMES,
TORTS § 18.3 (1956). But cf. SPEISER § 4.32.
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Such decisions [permitting sentimental factors to be tacitly con-
sidered] do not appear very likely to command respect for the ad-
ministration of justice; 'but it seems evident that it is the theory
which is wrong, and not the result.6 5
Nevertheless, several alternative means of computing damages for the death
of a child have been proposed.
In a leading case,66 the Michigan court devised what has been called
the "lost investment" rule67 whereby the loss of the child-decedent's consort-
ium is compensable. That is, the
value was to be measured by the functioning value of the human
being as a part of the family, taking into account, as in the case
of a machine in a factory, the expenses heretofore incurred, and
treating the child as a unit in place. 68
These expenses are readily determinable. The parents are given what in
effect is restitution for birth costs, financial contributions, food, clothing, and
shelter. This is the parents' lost investment, and, when combined with the
value of the child's society and companionship, determine the value of the
child to that family. This method has gained some favor by the au-
thorities. 9
Illinois does not subscribe to either the "wage-profit" or "lost invest-
ment" approaches. 70  The pattern jury instruction 7' simply includes pecun-
65. PROSSER § 127, at 909.
66. Wycko v. Gnodke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960). See also PROS-
SER § 127, at 909.
67. Comment, A Modern View of Wrongful Death Recoveries, 54 Nw. U.L. REv.
254, 261 (1959).
68. PROSSER § 127, at 909.
69. At present sixteen jurisdictions permit (under various theories) compensation
for the companionship and society of the lost child. Annot., Measure and Elements of
Damages for Personal Injury Resulting in Death of Infant, 14 A.L.R.2d 485, 494, 499
(1950), 196 (Supp. 1973).
70. Zostautas v. St. Anthony de Padua Hosp., 23 III. 2d 326, 178 N.E.2d 303
(1961); I.P.I., § 31.01.01; PROSSER § 127, at 909; SPEISER, note 5 supra, § 4.17-28;
Pavalon, Damages-Wrongful Death of Children, 50 Cm. B. REc. 84, 86 (1968). See
also 3 Loy. (Cmi.) U.L.J. 402, 412 (1972): 22 U. Cm. L. REv. 538 (1955).
71. I.P.I. § 31.01.01 (1965). In pertinentpart:
Measure of Damages-Wrongful Death-Young Child-Lineal Next of Kin Sur-
viving
In determining pecuniary loss, and the weight to be given to the pre-
sumption of pecuniary loss, you may consider what benefits of pecuniary
value, including money, goods, and services the decedent might reasonably
have been expected to contribute to his (lineal next of kin) had the decedent
lived, bearing in mind what you find the evidence shows concerning the de-
cedent's age, sex, (and) health (and) (physical and mental characteristics)
(and habits).
Note on Use
Where the decedent has reached an age sufficient to permit evidence of
either physical or mental characteristics or habits, it will be appropriate to
use the bracketed material . . . .Frequently in cases involving young children
there will be no proof of the child's habits, and in those cases the bracketed
words "and habits" should not be used.
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iary benefits which the decedent might reasonably have contributed to his
next of kin. Neither past expenditures made in anticipation of raising a
child, nor the value of the child as a member of the family, are compensable.
To be considered by the trier of fact in this determination are the decedent's
age, sex, and health. As conjectural as this may seem in the case of a young
child, it is a fortiori conjectural when the plaintiff is unborn. 72  It appears
that only evidence of the decedent's sex and prenatal health are relevant
to these issues. Evidence of the degree of conjecture is shown by the wide
disparity in the amount of jury verdicts.
73
Thus the determination of damages in the Chrisafogeorgis-type case
where the fetus is fatally injured before birth presents greater difficulty.
In those states which have permitted the action (save those following the
Michigan rule), the traditional pecuniary loss formula is often used.
74
Logically, those who criticize the pecuniary loss method in the wrongful
death of a child also criticize that method when used to evaluate the wrong-
ful death of a fetus.7 5 But again suggestions are offered.
One writer is incisive in his statement of the problem:
[T]he grant of compensation . . . to the parents of an infant
[who has died] in utero is in reality pure speculation and duplicity
. . . .It is not submitted that the tortious destroyer of a child in
utero should be able to escape completely by killing instead of
merely maiming. But it is submitted that to compensate the par-
ents any further than they are entitled by well-settled principles
of law and to give 'them a windfall through the estate of the fetus
is blatant punishment. The actual-pecuniary-4oss basis of compen-
sation in wrongful death actions has, where the -award will be
based on speculation, given way in some states to a fixed sum of
money .... 76
72. PROSSER § 127, at 908; 22 U. CH. L. REV. 538, 542 (1955).
73. As culled from the COOK COUNTY JURY VERDICT REPORTER, the mean verdict
in wrongful death actions for children under age 5 from 1969 through 1973 is $32,900.
The average compromise offer is therein shown to be $13,000. The URBAN RING
REPORTER outside Cook County shows mean verdicts for the same type case to be under
$8,000. The disparity in Cook County is shown by the extremes. Compare, e.g.,
$14,500 for a seven year-old boy, with $162,000 ($115,000 actual damages, $45,000
punitive) for a five year-old girl.
74. See note 69 supra. The statutes, which are somewhat less than uniform, are
summarized in Comment, A Modern View of Wrongful Death Recoveries, 54 Nw. U.L.
REV. 254, 255 (1959).
75. E.g., PROSSER § 127, at 909; Gordon 594; 1960 U. ILL. L. FOR. 593, 600.
But cf. 13 J. FAM. L. 99, 106 (1973); 70 MICH. L. REV. 729, 745. The unique Cali-
fornia Wrongful Death Statute (CAL. CIV. PRO. § 377 (West Supp. 1970)), which
specifically excludes minors, is discussed in Gordon 595.
76. Gordon 594. While it appears that no state requires a fixed-sum award, sev-
eral set a maximum or minimum. For example, Rhode Island requires a minimum re-
covery of $5,000. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-7-2 (1973). Wisconsin allows the surviving
parents their pecuniary loss plus $5,000 maximum for the loss of the child's consor-
tium. WISc. STAT. ANN. § 895.04 (1974). One author suggests a fixed sum of $1,000
plus reimbursement of actual expenses. Anderson, A Model State Wrongful Death Act,
1 HARv. J. LEG. 28, 34, 42 (1964).
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This fixed-sum approach should be compared with one which is similar yet
more flexible. This author 77 suggests a fixed statutory minimum supple-
mented by the parents' actual lost investment in the child or fetus.
This restitutional method is suggested to be the most rational and prac-
tical method of measuring damages in the tortious death of a young child.
It would in theory have the additional effect of granting a lesser sum in
the stillbirth situation, since fewer expenses are incurred when a fetus fails
to survive birth. In the adult-decedent situation the pecuniary loss formula
is well-suited to do its job: that of keeping the decedent's dependents safe
and secure. But in the case of the child-decedent the function of recovery
should be entirely different. First, the pecuniary loss rule was implemented
when children worked for the family during their minority. That situation
is now rare, if not a complete anachronism. Furthermore, while each hu-
man life is unique, pragmatically speaking, contemporary family-planning
parents may simply be expected to have another child. If they cannot, then
of course the parents have suffered redoubled injury, for which they ought
justifiably recover. As a matter of basic public policy, a restitutional a-p-
proach will 'better encourage the parents to forget their grievous loss, and
start over again, rather than (as under the pecuniary loss method) encour-
age the parents to dwell upon what their child might have produced in the
future. This result should be codified into the Illinois statutes.
The term "viability" has lately received some notoriety. It is central
not only to the instant case, but has been given superadded importance in
light of recent abortion decisions 78 by the Supreme Court of -the United
States. The next section elaborates on medical opinion as to the meaning
of this elusive term.
PROOF OF FETAL VIABILITY*
Due to recent advances in the science of medicine, the law has had
much difficulty in the determination of when life begins and ends. While
philosophy and theology 'have opinions on the matter,79 the law has tradi-
77. Comment, A Modern View of Wrongful Death Recoveries, 54 Nw. U.L. REV.
254, 261 (1959). A variation on this theme has been propounded:
"An arbitrary but substantial measure of damages would perhaps be the
best solution. Such an award might be a fixed amount or a scale within
which the jury could fix damages. At the same time it would be wise to con-
tinue the recognition of actual economic harm. This could be done by a stat-
utory provision requiring specific proof of economic loss."
Comment, Damages for the Wrongful Death of Children, 22 U. Cm. L. REV. 538, 550
(1955).
78. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
* The author wishes to thank Dr. Rowine Hayes Brown, M.D., J.D., Medical
Director, Cook County Hospital, and Dr. John J. Fennessy, M.D., Professor and Chair-
man of the Department of Radiology in the Pritzker School of Medicine of the Uni-
versity of Chicago, for their most helpful suggestions on this point.
79. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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tionally turned to medicine for guidance in answering these questions.
While medicine 'has had some consensus as to the precise time of death,80
the same cannot be said in regard to the precise beginning of human life.
The existence of fetal viability is pertinent here because the survivors
of a stillborn fetus, injured while in a previable state, 8' have no action for
wrongful death in Illinois. In the typical case of a possibly viable fetus,
the physician who has rendered prenatal care will be called as an expert
witness. He will be asked his opinion whether the fetus was or was not
viable, both at .the time of the last pretrauma examination and at the time
of the injury. Counsel for plaintiff, in his cross-examination of defendant's
experts,8 2 will attempt to establish the fact of viability by reference to -the
minimal standards of fetal viability discussed below. The defendant, in
cross-examining plaintiff's experts, will try to show that the fetus was not
viable at the time of the injury by reference to the most stringent standards
of viability, and hence no action for wrongful death should lie. The post-
trauma examining physician will also be called to give his opinion whether
the fetus was viable at the time of the injury. Also, any pathologist who
examined -the fetus might also be called to ascertain whether the fetus was
viable at the time of the injury.
In addition to proving viability, plaintiff must also show that the injury
was a material or substantial factor in the death of the fetus. As the proxi-
mate cause issue is discussed elsewhere,83 this section will examine the fac-
tors which determine fetal viability, both in utero and postpartum.
Noteworthy here is the recent Supreme Court case of Roe v. Wade.
84
In that decision viability also plays a supporting role. In partitioning the
human gestation period into three stages, the Court stated that:
For the [third] stage subsequent to viability the State, in promot-
ing its interest in the potentiality of human life, may, if it chooses,
regulate, and even proscribe, abortion .... 85
Thus, a legislature must consider the concept of fetal viability in drafting
an abortion statute. It is hoped ,that this discussion will better enable that
body to define a viable fetus.
Abortion is the termination of a pregnancy at any time before the fe-
80. See, e.g., Note, A Survey of the Legal Aspects of Organ Transplantation, 50
CI.-KENT L. REV. 510, 518-23 (1973).
81. Where there is a continuing injury which occurs during both previability and
viability (as by noxious medicine), it is suggested that a wrongful death action ought to
lie if a material and substantial injury has been sustained during the stage of viability.
82. See Darling v. Charleston Community Mer. Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211
N.E.2d 253 (1965); McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 321 (2d ed. 1972), WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 1690. But see UN. R. Ev. Rule 63(31) (1953).
83. Note 33 supra.
84. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
85. Id. at 164.
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tus has attained a stage of viability.86 Viability is the time at which a child
is capable of being delivered and remaining alive separate from and inde-
pendent of the mother.8 7 This capability, in turn, is a direct function of
lung and nervous system for purposes of respiration, and varies in each parti-
cular case. One expert states it:
A most significant milestone in lung development appears to occur
,at about 26-28 weeks when the -fetus weighs about one kilogram.
At this time the capillary network, which arose about the 20th
week . . . proliferates close to the developing ,airway. Extruterine
existence is not possible until there is a sufficiently extensive sur-
face area of the lung for gas exchange.
88
Another, while substantially agreeing, notes:
[R]espiratory movements of the fetus may be seen as early as the
18th week of gestation . . . Respiration may occur in the fetus
delivered at 18 weeks.8 9
While the question of viability turns on the development of the fetal lung,
a necessary concomitant is the maturity of the central nervous system. Spe-
cifically, impulses from the medulla and the thoracic spinal cord must be
able to compel the lungs to breathe. 0 Otherwise no respiration may occur.
There are numerous secondary factors in the determination of fetal vi-
ability. The two most important factors, birth weight and gestational age,
are discussed in some detail. The others shall be treated seriatim.
Weight at birth is an easy and objective criterion of fetal viability. For
this reason, birth weight is the sole determinant of viability under interna-
tional agreement. 91 Thus the World Health Organization has established
that, for statistical purposes, fetuses below 500 g. (1.1 lbs.) at birth are not
viable. 9 2 However, this conclusion is not supported by the weight of medi-
cal authority; most choose 1000 g. (2.2 lbs.) as the standard. 93  Neverthe-
86. HELLMAN & PRITCHARD, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 493 (14th ed. 1971) (herein-
after cited as WILLIAMS).
87. Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill. 2d 368, 374, 304 N.E.2d 88, 92
(1973).
88. AVERY, THE LUNG AND ITS DISORDERS IN THE NEWBORN INFANT 5 (1964).
The average human gestation period is 38 weeks, or 40 weeks from the onset of the last
menses. 5B LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA OF PERSONAL INJURIES AND ALLIED
SPECIALTIES § 37.2a (1972) (hereinafter cited as L.M.C.).
89. NELSON, TEXTBOOK OF PEDIATRICS 19 (8th ed. 1964) (hereinafter cited as
NELSON). At about 21-24 weeks, the chemical surfactin appears in the fetal lung.
This has the effect of lowering the surface tension in the lung, which in turn allows the
lung to expand normally and support life. COTES, LUNG FUNCTION 345 (2d ed. 1968).
90. TUTTLE AND SCHOTTELIUS, TEXTBOOK OF PHYSIOLOGY 462 (14th ed. 1961).
But see note 100 in ra.
91. BREWS, MANUAL OF OBSTETRICS 702 (12th ed. 1963).
92. 5 GRAY, ATTORNEY'S TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE § 307.11(2) (3d ed. 1973)
(hereinafter cited as GRAY). For comparison, the average full term birth weight is
3350 g. for boys and 3050 g. for girls. L.M.C. § 37.2b.
93. Accord, AVERY, note 88 supra; BREWS, note 91 supra, at 62; POTTERa &
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less, some set 400 g. (14 oz.) as the point at which viability begins, 9 4 noting
that the lightest babies on record to survive have weighed 39695 and 397
g.
9 6
The determination of precise gestational age is very difficult. 97  How-
ever, most authorities believe that, in the normal pregnancy of 38-40 weeks
since conception, viability is possible from 26-28 weeks onward.98  Some,
however, state that viability is possible as early as the 20th week of gesta-
tion.99  The youngest recorded surviving infant was born in the 18th week
of pregnancy. 100
A list of the factors used in the determination of the stage of pregnancy
would be helpful to the attorney questioning a medical expert. While the
fetus is in utero (and no twinning has occurred), 10 1 the doctor may listen
for the fetal heartbeat, 10 2 palpate active movements, 0 3 observe progressive
increase in fetal size,' 0 4 utilize a fetal electrocardiograph or other monitor, '"
employ ultrasonics, 106 or x-ray the femur, tibia, humerus, skull, or pelvis.'
0 7
ADAIR, FETAL AND NEONATAL DEATH 82 (1949); REED, PRINCIPLES AND MANAGEMENT
OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION 795 (1972); ULLERY & HOLLENBECK, TEXTBOOK OF OB-
STETRICS 126 (1965); WILLIAMS, note 86 supra, at 493. With proper care, the new-
born weighing less than 1000 g. has a 20% chance of survival. GREENHILL, OBSTETRICS,
834 (12th ed. 1960).
94. DANFORTH, OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 310 (1966). Cf. REID, note 93
supra, at 254 (500 g.); STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1388 (22d ed. 1972) (500
g.). But cf. GRAY §§ 307.11(2), 307.32, 311.00 (1500 g.).
95. GREENHILL, OBSTETmCS 563 (13th ed. 1965). See also 21 OKLA. L. REV.
114, 119 (1968).
96. WILLIAMS, note 86 supra, at 493.
97. Interview with Dr. J. Laurance Hill, M.D., of the University of Chicago Hos-
pitals, in Chicago, March 11, 1974.
98. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973) (24-28 weeks); 9 AM. JUR. PROOF
OF FACTS Prenatal Injuries 533-6 (1961) (25-28 weeks); AVERY, note 88 supra (26-28
weeks); NELSON, note 89 supra (28 weeks); POTTER, note 93 supra (26-28 weeks);
REID, note 93 supra, at 795 (28 weeks).
99. STEDMAN, note 94 supra (20 weeks); REID, note 93 supra, at 254 (20 weeks);
WILLSON, OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 4 (4th ed. 1971) (20 weeks). The World
Health Org. uses 20 weeks for statistical purposes. GRAY § 307.32.
100. NELSON, note 89 supra. While the infant may have been able to respire, this
does not mean that he was able to digest and assimilate food. 9 AM. Jut. PROOF
OF FACTS Prenatal Injuries 536 (1961). Thus while there has been a live birth, the child
may have died of starvation within a few hours. 70 MICH. L. REV. 729, 752-5 (1972).
101. In the case of a multiple birth, these factors are much less reliable. Interview
with Dr. Rowine Hayes Brown, in Chicago, March 27, 1974.
102. L.M.C. § 37.2b. But the inability to detect the fetal heart (even as late as
seven months) does not necessarily mean the fetus is dead. Id.
103. DANFORTH, note 94 supra, at 264.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. DONALD, PRACTICAL OBSTETRIC PROBLEMS 938 (4th ed. 1971).
107. Id.; L.M.C. § 37.2b; LUSTED & KEATS, ATLAS OF ROENTGOENOGRAPHIC MEA-
SUREMENT 166 (1959).
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Other evidence of previous viability will appear after a stillbirth. That
is, the eyelids have separated, 08 testicles descended, 10 9 nails reached the tips
of the digits," 0 and the downy coat of lanugo hair presented."' An autopsy
of the lungs and spine will then directly show whether the fetus would have
been able .to respire had he not been injured.1 2 However, it may take as
long as one month before the dead fetus has been expelled by the mother."1
During this period, sufficient atrophy may have occurred to render the
autopsy nugatory. 1
4
Fetal death may 'be diagnosed while in utero by the following: 1 5 cessa-
tion of uterine growth, regression in uterine size, regression in size of ma-
ternal breasts, cessation of fetal movement, absence of fetal heartbeat, disap-
pearance of a previously observed electrocardiogram, absence of uterine bruit,
x-ray of skull and spine, maceration of the fetal skin, various biologic tests,
and the mother's loss of weight.
Finally, there are more minor characteristics of fetal viability. These
are the availability of expert neonatal care,'1 6 height at birth," l7 maternal
health, 18 maternal nutrition,1 1 9 the amount of certain hormones present in
the uterus, 1 20 and the mother's socioeconomic class.' 21 These factors correl-
late with, rather than cause fetal viability. For example, delivery in a fully-
equipped hospital 'with well-trained personnel tends to increase the chances
of survival.
It appears that the following diagnoses are essential to plaintiff's case.
He must first establish that the fetus was viable at the time of the injury.
This may ibe done by showing that the fetus was viable at the time of the
last pretrauma examination. If not, then plaintiff must show that the fetus
108. GRADWOHL, note 33 supra, at 443.
109. L.M.C. § 37.2b, Table 1.
110. PATTEN, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY 237 (1946).
111. Id. at 239.
112. Id.
113. Interview with Dr. Rowine Hayes Brown, in Chicago, March 27, 1974.
114. Id.
115. DANFORTH, note 94 supra, at 264.
116. WILLAMS 493.
117. A fetus with a crown-to-heel height of 35 cm. (13 in.) is quite uniformly con-
sidered viable. See, e.g., L.M.C. § 37.2b.
118. Id. § 37.16.
119. Unlike mere diet deficiency, malnutrition in the pregnant woman leads to a
high incidence of stillbirths and of premature births. NELSON 18. A premature infant
is a viable fetus born before term. WILLIAMS 493. One writer estimates that 5-10% of
U.S. births per year are premature. MONTAGU, PRENATAL INFLUENCES 399 (1962).
On the subject of statistics, another writer estimates the incidence of abortion (note 86
supra) to birth rate of theoretically viable infants is 20%. HOLLENBECK, note 93 supra,
at 126. Also, prenatal injury accounts for 15.4% of total infant death. SAPImO, IN-
FANT, PERINATAL, MATERNAL, & CILDHOOD MORTALITY 28 (1968).
120. FETAL EVALUATION DURING PREGNANCY AND LABOR (Milan Symposium) 37,
65 (1971).
121. BREws, note 91 supra, at 703.
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had at least attained viability at the time of the injury. This may be proved
by testimony of the posttrauma examining physician or pathologist. Sec-
ondly, plaintiff must establish that the fetus was dead after the injury.
Defining fetal viability is frought with problems of imprecision. Gesta-
tional age is imprecise since the experts differ by as much as eight weeks
in this determination, and further that gestational age is so difficult to deter-
mine. The weight standard of 1000 grams is helpful as a generality, but
need not be determinative of viability in the particular case. Also, in those
states which have proscribed third trimester abortions, a doctor performing
an abortion will not know until the abortus has been weighed (and thus
after the abortion itself) whether he has committed a crime. Despite these
difficulties, it is hoped that this discussion will provide some guidance to the
trial lawyer in his effort to establish or refute the existence of a fetus who
was viable when fatally injured.
SUMMARY
Most jurisdictions permit -the survivors of a fatally injured viable fetus,
born dead, to sue the tortfeasor in an action for wrongful death. Illinois
is now a part of this majority. However, two problems left open by this
result have been dealt with in greater detail.
First, the measure of damages for the wrongful death of a fetus is
still the amount of pecuniary loss suffered by the next of kin. This formula,
while proper in the case of an adult decedent, is suggested to be inappro-
priate where the decedent is a fetus or young child. The alternative herein
recommended is a fixed statutory amount, supplemented by a reimburse-
ment of any investment lost as a result of the death of the child.
The second problem concerned the characteristics inherent in a viable
fetus. The major attribute of viability is the capacity of the lungs to respire.
In addition, numerous correlative characteristics of viability were mentioned,
primarily weight and gestational age at the time of injury. That is, a fatally
injured fetus was probably viable when it weighed more than one kilogram
and had a gestational age of more than 26 weeks. However, substantial
deviation from these figures exists among medical authorities. This indi-
cates a sufficient difference of expert opinion to enable counsel, in a close
case, to prove or refute the existence of a viable fetus.
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